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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
CIVIL JURISDICTION: Amendment of Tribal Code
Twin City Construction Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chip-
pewa Indians, 911 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1990).
Ernest Parisien, a Turtle Mountain Band tribal member, sub-
contracted with Twin City, a non-Indian general contractor
working on the reservation. A dispute arose between Parisien
and Twin City over unsatisfactory work and untimely payments.
After Parisien notified Twin City that work would be suspended
until spring because of extreme cold weather, Twin City hired
another subcontractor to complete the work. Parisien filed suit
in the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court for payment of work
performed and damages.
The Turtle Mountain Tribal Court held that it lacked juris-
diction over Twin City because Twin City had not submitted to
the court's jurisdiction as required by the tribal code.' The tribal
appellate court found there was jurisdiction and remanded the
case. 2
Twin City challenged the assertion of jurisdiction in federal
district court by seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to
prohibit the tribal court proceeding. The district court held that
there was no jurisdiction and entered a permanent injunction.3
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, a divided panel reversed the
lower court, holding there was tribal court jurisdiction. But on
rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the judgment of the
district court.4
While the case was pending appeal in the Eighth Circuit, the
Turtle Mountain Band amended its tribal code to provide for
1. Turtle Mountain Tribal Code, tit. 2, § 2.0102(1) (1976) provided:
[The] Tribal Court shall have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in any
particular case where they submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court by instituting an action against an Indian and filing cash bond in
the amount of the damages asked, or by submitting himself to the Court's
jurisdiction.
2. Parisien v. Twin City Constr. Co., No. 66-86 (Turtle Mountain Tribal App.
Ct. June 6, 1986).
3. Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, No.
A2-86-124 (D.N.D. Aug. 24. 1987).
4. Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 866
F.2d 971 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989).
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jurisdiction over parties such as Twin City.5 Seeking relief from
the judgment of the district court, Parisien filed a rule 60(b)(5)
motion.6 However, the district court did not entirely dissolve its
injunction against Parisien, so he filed a rule 59(e) motion.7 The
district court found that the basis on which the permanent
injunction was issued no longer existed because the tribal code
amendment provided for jurisdiction in all pending cases. 8
The issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the permanent
injunction should be lifted in its entirety because the district
court abused its discretion in failing to explain the denial of
Parisien's motion.
The Eighth Circuit found that there was abuse of discretion
by the district court because the lower court had not explained
the denial of Parisien's motion.9 In reviewing the district court's
conclusions, the court found no reason why the permanent
injunction should not be entirely dissolved.'0
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
remanded to dissolve the permanent injunction so that Parisien
could proceed with his tribal court action."
5. The amended Turtle Mountain Tribal Code, tit. 2, § 2.0102(l)(a)(b) (1987)
provides, in pertinent part:
[The Tribe shall have jurisdiction over]
(a) Business transactions conducted within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Tribal Court as defined in Section 2.0102(3) of this Code; and
(b) Contracts to be performed within the Court's territorial juisdictioil,
including contracts to insure any person, property or risk, located within
the Court's territorial jurisdiction.
6. Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons:
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)5).
7. Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 911
F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1990). Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend
the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment."
FED. R. Crv. P. 59(e).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 137.
10. Id. at 139.
1I. Id. The court clarified that its decision was not a determination of tribal court
jurisdiction.
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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Dependent Indian Community
Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, -- S. Ct. -- (Jan. 7, 1991).
A New Mexico state court convicted Charles Blatchford, a
Navajo Indian, of accessory to criminal sexual penetration of a
child and accessory to the kidnapping of a second child. Both
of the children involved were Navajo. The crimes occurred at a
rural community, Yah-Ta-Hey, which is not on reservation land
but is surrounded by the Navajo Reservation. The court sen-
tenced Blatchford to 10 to 50 years on the first court, and life
imprisonment on the second count.
After Blatchford unsuccessfully appealed in state courts, he
filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the grounds
that the state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for the of-
fenses. Blatchford contended that the federal court had exclusive
jurisdiction of the case under the federal Major Crimes Act'
because the situs had reservation status, or in the alternative,
was a dependent Indian community pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1151.2 However, the district court held that Yah-Ta-Hey was
not a dependent Indian community. 3
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the commu-
nity, Yah-Ta-Hey, was Indian Country or a dependent Indian
community.4
First, the court concluded that there was no reservation status
pursuant to section 1151(a) relying on an earlier decision of the
court.' The court then reviewed the history and case law of
"dependent Indian community. ' 6 It agreed with the lower court's
1. The Major Crimes Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other persons any of the following offenses, namely ... kidnapping,
rape ... , within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws
and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982).
2. Indian Country, for the purposes of the Major Crimes Act, is defined as "all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government, ... all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States ... , [and] all Indian allotments ....." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
3. There is no record that the court considered the issue of whether Yah-Ta-Hey
had reservation status.
4. Blatchford conceded that the situs was not an Indian allotment under section
1151(c).
5. Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1990). See Pittsburgh &
Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990) (reservation status
lost when executive orders 1000 & 1284 were issued in 1988).
6. Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542, 544-47 (10th Cir. 1990).
No. 1]
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use of the guidelines set out in United States v. Martine and
United States v. South Dakota.8 The court determined that Yah-
Ta-Hey was not born out of a public need to provide land for
occupancy, use, and protection of a dependent people, but
instead for private, commercial gain. The factors the court
considered were: (1) local merchants bought Navajo goods for
distribution elsewhere, (2) the Yah-Ta-Hey community was a
non-Indian commercial intersection, and (3) the Yah-Ta-Hey
community was characterized as a suburb of Gallup, New Mex-
ico. 9 Furthermore, the court stated, there was no indication that
Congress intended to include communities like Yah-Ta-Hey un-
der the Major Crimes Act. 10
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
Yah-Ta-Hey was neither a dependent Indian community for
purposes of the Major Crimes Act nor a community located
within the Navajo Reservation, and dismissed Blatchford's ha-
beas corpus petition."
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: State Jurisdiction
Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990).
Ronnie Ross, a Cherokee, was at a ballpark known as the
Greasy Ballpark, located on Cherokee tribal trust land. The
ballpark was leased to the South Greasy Community Park As-
sociation for five years. The president of the South Greasy
Community Park Association, also a Cherokee tribal member,
called the county sheriff's department requesting a patrol of the
ballpark because people were speeding, loitering, and drinking
alcohol.
7. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971). Factors considered in determining the status
of a dependent Indian community were:
(1) the nature of the area in question;
(2) the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to
the federal government; and,
(3) the established practice of government agencies toward the area.
Id. at 1023.
8. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981) (Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux tribal housing project
was Ea dependent Indian community).
9. Blatchford, 904 F.2d at 548-49. The court also determined that Yah-Ta-Hey
was not a housing project community. Id. at 549. In addition, the court stated that
mere presence of Indians in a particular area does not convert the area in to a dependent
Indian community. Id.
10. Id. at 549.
11. Id.
270 [Vol. 16
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Deputy McLemore went to the park and attempted to arrest
Ross for public intoxication. During the arrest, the Deputy shot
Ross in the leg.'
Ross filed two fourth amendment2 claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 19831 against the deputy, the county sheriff, and the
county. The first claim alleged Ross' arrest was illegal because
the ballpark was tribal trust land, that is, in Indian Country,
and state peace officers have no jurisdiction in Indian Country.
The second claim was that McLemore used excessive force in
arresting Ross.4
The district court directed a verdict in favor of the county.5
The first trial had ended in mistrial, but a subsequent jury trial
resulted in a verdict in favor of the deputy.6
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit separated the section 1983 claim
and the jurisdictional claim. The issues before the Tenth Circuit
were (1) whether the district court erred as a matter of law in
holding that Deputy McLemore acted within his jurisdictional
limits when he arrested Ross; (2) whether the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity;7 and (3) whether the defendants
were liable for use of excessive force.
The appellate court determined that Greasy Ballpark was
Indian country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151.8 Therefore, the
1. Ross' leg eventually had to be amputated because of medical complications. At
this writing, it is unknown whether Ross has a civil action pending.
2. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, ... shall not be violated, ... but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
3. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State .... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, . .. or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
4. Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1351 (10th Cir. 1990).
5. Id. at 1351. The court rejected Ross' claims that the county (1) allowed its
officers to make arrests in Indian country, and (2) failed to supervise and train
McLemore.
6. Id.
7. Qualified immunity is a defense if it is shown a police officer could not have
reasonably known that the challenged actions violated the law. Id. at 1354.
8. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines Indian country as "any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government .... all dependent Indian communities
... , [and] all Indian allotments .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)-(c) (1982).
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state had no criminal jurisdiction in the ballpark. 9 The court
agreed that the deputy's actions were made outside his jurisdic-
tion, and thus were violative of the fourth amendment and
actionable under section 1983.10 However, the court added that
Deputy McLemore was entitled to qualified immunity because
a reasonable peace officer would not know he did not have
jurisdiction on Indian tribal trust land.1 As a result, the jury
verdict in favor of the deputy was not affected by the lack of
jurisdiction.' 2 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the lower court
erred in directing a verdict in favor of the county; the Tenth
Circuit remanded this claim to the lower court because the
county was not entitled to qualified immunity.' 3
On the separate issue of use of excessive force, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the county.' 4
The court remanded the section 1983 claim against the county
for retrial without any liability for use of excessive force.'5
CRIMINAL CONVICTION UNDER THE FOREST
ALLOTMENT ACT OF 1910
United States v. Kent, 912 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1990).
In 1984, Lavon Kent, a Karuk Indian, moved to Sandy Bar
Creek after receiving a certificate of eligibility from the De-
partment of the Interior for an allotment pursuant to the Forest
Allotment Act of 1910.1 Kent moved a trailer (which she used
as her living quarters) to the site and planted a garden.
9. Ross, 905 F.2d at 1352-53.
10. Id. at 1353-54.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1355.
13. Id. at 1354-55.
14. Id. at 1355.
15. Id.
1. Title 25 U.S.C. § 377 states, in relevant part:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to make
allotments within the national forests in conformity with the general
allotment laws, to any Indian occupying, living on, or having improvements
on land included within any such national forest who is not entitled to an
allotment on any existing Indian reservation, or for whose tribe no res-
ervation has been provided ....
25 U.S.C. § 377 (1983). Kent's certificate of allotment, dated January 18, 1982, provided,
in relevant part, that "Kent... is eligible as an Indian to receive land ... in a national
forest under Section 31 of the [Forest Allotment Act]." United States v. Kent, 912 F.2d
277, 278 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).
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In 1987, the federal government filed charges against Kent
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 5512 and 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b). 3 The
district court found her guilty of unauthorized residential oc-
cupancy and sentenced her to 30 days in jail and fined her $25.
Kent appealed her conviction to the Ninth Circuit.
The issues before the Ninth Circuit were whether the district
court erred in holding Kent did not have aboriginal rights to
occupy the land at Sandy Bar Creek,4 and whether Kent pos-
sessed the requisite mens rea to violate 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b).5
Although the district court did not consider whether Kent had
aboriginal rights to occupy the site, the Ninth Circuit found no
error. The Ninth Circuit determined that the lower court had
correctly held that any such rights were extinguished by Kent's
failure to show that her lineal ancestors had continuously oc-
cupied the land before it was withdrawn from entry. 6
The appellate court examined the statutory language of the
Act and found that the government failed to prove that Kent
had the mens rea necessary for her conviction.7 The court also
held that Kent's conviction could not stand because due process
required that she have sufficient notice that her conduct might
be unlawful." The court then ruled that there were questions on
what was allowed under 25 U.S.C. § 337, and whether the
dispute between Kent and the Forest Service should be resolved
2. This section requires the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the occupancy
and use of national forests, and further provides that violation of the regulation shall
be punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment of not more than six
months, or both.
3. Title 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) prohibits "Ilt]aking possession of, occupying, or
otherwise using National Forest System lands for residential purposes without a special-
use authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or regulation." 36 C.F.R.
§ 261.10(b) (1990).
4. Kent's great-grandmother lived at Sandy Bar Creek until her death in 1870,
and Kent's mother was born one mile from Sandy Bar Creek and lived there until 1939.
No other blood relatives of Kent lived at Sandy Bar Creek from 1870 to 1984. Kent,
912 F.2d at 278. See United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1989) (aboriginal
title can only be extinguished by Congress or by authorization of Congress). Thus, an
individual could show that lineal ancestors held and occupied a particular tract of land
from time immemorial and that the title was never extinguished. Id. at 1196.
5. The lower court also determined whether Kent intended to violate 36 C.F.R. §
261.10(b). The district court held she did possess the necessary mens rea. United States
v. Kent, 679 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
6. Kent, 912 F.2d at 277, 278.
7. Id. at 278-79.
8. Id. at 279-81. The court rejected the government 's argument that the Act was
a strict liability offense. Id. at 280.
No. 1]
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through a civil action.9 The court rejected the district court's
conviction. 10
The dissent agreed with the majority that the district court
correctly decided that Kent did not have aboriginal title to the
land.." However, the dissent disagreed with the majority on the
issues (1) that 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) did not create a strict
liability offense; (2) that the requisite scienter was knowledge
on the part of the violator that he conduct was unlawful; and
(3) whether Kent lacked the requisite knowledge was a question
of fact. 12
PRISONER'S RIGHTS
Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
Iron Eyes, a Standing Rock Sioux Indian, had very long hair.
He believed that his hair was a gift from the Great Spirit and
that to cut his hair (except to symbolize grief for the loss of a
loved one) would offend the Creator. In fact, Iron Eyes had
cut his hair only five times in 27 years: three times in mourning,
and twice at the order of prison officials, pursuant to prison
regulations.
In 1987, Iron Eyes was incarcerated in Missouri's Farmington
Correctional Center. Iron Eyes protested the cutting of his hair,
arguing that it was against his Native American religious beliefs.
The prison officials stated the prison records did not indicate
whether Iron Eyes was Native American, and subsequently or-
dered him to conform to prison regulations. When Iron Eyes
refused to voluntarily cut his hair, the prison officials moved
him to disciplinary segregation and shackled and handcuffed
him while the prison barber cut his hair. Three months later,
on March 3, 1988, Iron Eyes filed a pro se complaint in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 alleging a civil rights violation.
9. Id. at 280-82.
10. Id. at 281.
11. Id. at 282 (Canby, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
1. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation ....
or any State . . . , subjects, . . . any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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In September 1988, the prison officials once again ordered
Iron Eyes to cut his hair. Iron Eyes obtained a temporary
restraining order from the federal district court that barred the
prison officials from again cutting his hair. He then filed a
second amended complaint for injunctive relief and compensa-
tory and punitive damages.2
The prison regulations provided an exception which allowed
Native Americans to grow and keep long hair.3 Iron Eyes sought
to invoke the exception before the prison officials. A hearing
was held and Iron Eyes submitted proof of Native American
descent. However, the prison zone director denied Iron Eyes the
exception. Following the prison's denial of the exception, the
district court entered an order for the prison officials and denied
a temporary injunction pending Iron Eyes' appeal to the Eighth
Circuit.
Iron Eyes then filed a similar motion for a temporary in-
junction in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to
prevent his hair from being cut. Pending the decision on the
motion, the prison officials again gave Iron Eyes the choice of
cutting his hair or facing disciplinary segregation. Rather than
face unwarranted punishment, Iron Eyes cut his hair. He then
appealed the district court's decision earlier order denying his
temporary injunction request.
The issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether Iron Eyes'
right to long hair, as an exercise of freedom of religion; was
outweighed by the soundness of the prison regulation. The circuit
court stated that prison inmates have valid constitutional rights,
including first amendment rights, even though they are incar-
cerated. 4 The court first addressed the sincerity of Iron Eyes'
2. Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 812 (8th Cir. 1990).
3. Div. Rule 116.050(3), Mo. ADMN. CODE tit. 14, div. 20, ch. 16. The rule
provides, in pertinent part:
(3) Hair will be clean, neatly groomed and no longer than the base of the
rear of the shirt collar. Neither extremely long hair ... will be permitted
with the exception indicated below ....
(A) Those inmates belonging to an indian [sic] tribe, who
have received a court ruling permitting them to grow long
hair, will be allowed to do so. Other inmates who claim to
belong to an indian [sic] tribe must present written docu-
mentation of such to the institution head. The institution
head will submit the item to the zone director for a final
decision ....
Id., quoted in Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 811 n.3.
4. Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 812.
No. 11
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religious reason for wearing his hair long.5 After the court
concluded that Iron Eyes' belief was sincere, the court applied
a four-factor test, as set forth in Turner v. Safley, 6 to determine
the reasonableness of the prison regulation.
In finding that the prison regulatioAi was legitimate and neu-
tral, the court examined the security objectives of curtailing the
smuggling of contraband in long hair and preventing escapees
from altering their appearance (by cutting their hair to avoid
detection or recognition). 7 The court held that "the district court
properly found rational nexus between the short hair regulation
and the valid neutral penological concerns behind it. ''8
The appellate court found that Iron Eyes was not precluded
from practicing some tenets of his religion, and that there was
a reasonable alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs. 9
Although Farmington Prison had only four Native Americans,
the court concluded that the increased cost of conducting longer
searches on inmates with long hair had a valid impact on guards,
other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. 10 Further-
more, exempting Native Americans from grooming regulations
would likely cause prison friction and unrest."
The court deferred to the discretion of the prison officials to
grant exemptions and determine whether an alternative to a
regulation exists.' 2 The court did question the possibility of
harassment of Iron Eyes because of the prison officials' prior
actions in declaring that Iron Eyes was not Native American
and then forcibly cutting his hair while this action was pending,
but affirmed the district court. 3
5. Id. at 813. The prisoner must establish he has a sincere religious belief and
that the challenged regulation infringes upon that belief. Id.
6. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The standard set out in Turner was "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 89. The four factors for
determining reasonableness of the regulation at issue are: (1) whether there is a valid,
rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral govern-
mental interest used to justify it; (2) whether alternative means exist for prisoner to
exercise the constitutional right at issue; (3) the impact that would be caused by
accommodation of the right on prison staff, inmates, and allocation of prison resources;
and (4) whether any alternative exists that would fully accommodate the prisoner's rights
at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 89-91.
7. Id. at 814.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 814-15.
10. Id. at 815.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 816.
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Judge Gerald Heaney's dissent stated that the regulation un-
reasonably infringed on the religious beliefs of Native Americans
because of the arbitrary discretion permitted prison officials in
granting exemptions . 4 Furthermore, Heaney argued, it was "in-
firm" and unreasonable for not setting forth the criteria for
allowing the exemption.' 5 Heaney added that the prison officials'
failure to ever approve an exemption is a basis for a claim of
arbitrary and capricious behavior.'6
Heaney added that an equal protection claim and a claim for
cruel and unusual punishment are present because of the alleged
vicious treatment of Iron Eyes and the physical abuse and
harassment he received. 17 Furthermore, Iron Eyes may have a
claim of retaliation against the prison officials because of their
abusive actions in forcibly cutting his hair and threatening him
with punishment while this appeal was pending. 8
REMOVAL OF TRIBAL COURT CASES TO FEDERAL
COURT
Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1990).
In 1982, Mary Becenti's son, now deceased, obtained a loan
for a laundry business located on the Jicarilla Apache Reser-
vation in New Mexico. He obtained the loan from the Jicarilla
Apache tribal credit committee. When Becenti's son died in
1985, the buyer of his share agreed to continue the loan. Mary
Becenti owned a 10 percent interest in the laundry. A Bureau
of Indian Affairs' loan specialist refused to accept payments by
the substitute obligor, and instructed the tribal credit committee
to foreclose on the loan. Mary Becenti filed a civil action in the
Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court for violation of trust responsibility
and breach of standard of care against the loan specialist and
his supervisor as federal employees.
The federal government's petition for removal to a federal
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)' was granted.
14. Id. at 816 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 819.
16. Id. at 822.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 823.
1. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court
against any of the folloing persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
No. 1]
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The government then moved for dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, failure to join an indispensable party, and
failure to prosecute. The government supported its motion on
grounds of sovereign immunity because the suit was against
federal officers acting within their scope of employment.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The court deter-
mined a judgment against the BIA loan specialist would, in
effect, be a judgment against the United States. 2 Becenti ap-
pealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit asserting that section
1442 only allowed removal from state courts, not tribal courts.
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether Congress
authorized removal of cases against federal officials from tribal
courts to federal district courts. The Tenth Circuit equated the
section 1442 definition of "state court" to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441
and 1443(1). These latter sections limited removal actions to the
fifty states.3 The court agreed with the government that the
power to remove cases involving government officials is essential
to the system of government. However, it refused to expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts in absence of express statutory
language.4
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress provided alter-
native federal forums for some federal employees but did not
guarantee every federal employee a forum under section 1442.1
The court concluded that until Congress resolves the need to
expand section 1442 to include removal from tribal courts, the
federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over them. 6
The court vacated the district court's order stating that the
removal from the tribal court was improvident and remanded
the place wherein it is pending:
(I) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof,
or person acting under him, for any act under color of such
office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed
under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punish-
ment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988).
2. Becenti v. Vigil, No. 87-1254JP (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 1988).
:1. Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Guam v. Landgraf,
594 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1979) (court whose jurisdiction is Guam is not a state
court).
4. Becenti, 902 F.2d at 779-80.
5. Id. at 780.
6. Id. at 780-81.
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the case to the district court for remand to the tribal court.7
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF TRIBAL COURT
DECISIONS
FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.
1990).
A non-Indian corporation, FMC, located its plant on fee land
within the Shoshone-Bannock Reservation, located near Fort
Hall, Idaho. FMC had 600 employees, making it the largest
employer on the Reservation. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes
(Tribes) passed a Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, (TERO),'
which required reservation employers to give preference to In-
dians in employment, contracting, and subcontracting. FMC
originally objected to the TERO but subsequently entered into
an employment agreement with the Tribes.
Dissatisfied with FMC's compliance with the employment
agreement, the Tribes filed a civil suit in the Shoshone-Bannock
Tribal Court. FMC challenged the tribal court's jurisdiction in
federal district court. The district court enjoined the Tribes from
enforcement of any orders against FMC until the tribal court
ruled on the jurisdiction question. 2
The tribal court held that it had jurisdiction over the dispute
and found FMC in violation of the TERO. 3 The tribal appellate
court affirmed the lower tribal court's decision. 4 However, the
federal district court held that the Tribes did not have jurisdic-
tion over FMC, reversed the holding of the tribal appellate
court, and granted FMC a preliminary injunction.5 The Tribes
then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the Tribes
had the power to enforce the TERO over non-Indians located
on fee land on the Reservation. FMC argued for a standard of
"clearly erroneous" on questions of fact and de novo review
for questions of law, and the Tribes argued for a standard of
7. Id. at 781.
1. Shoshone-Bannock Tribe Employment Ordinance, EMPT-80-54 (July 22, 1980)
(approved by the Secretary of the Interior Oct. 14, 1980).
2. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. 87-4059 (D. Idaho April 14, 1989).
3. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. FMC, No. C-87-39 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct.
July 22, 1987).
4. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. C-87-64 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal
App. Ct. May 19, 1988).
5. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990).
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"clearly erroneous" on mixed questions of law and fact. The
federal district court had applied an "independent review" stan-
dard.6
The Ninth Circuit held that, for factual questions, the stan-
dard of review was the "clearly erroneous" standard, and de
novo for questions of law. 7 The court reasoned that some def-
erence to tribal courts must be shown because of traditional
judicial respect to the first (trial) court of its fact-finding ability.8
The court cited the United States Supreme Court in National
Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians9 for the
exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine and the competency of
tribal courts issues. According to the Ninth Circuit, the devel-
opment of a factual record at the tribal court level serves as the
basis for a deferential, "clearly erroneous" standard of review
on questions of fact. 10 As for its decision mandating a de novo
standard of review for questions of law, the court stated that
tribad court review was helpful but that federal courts had no
obligation to follow tribal court expertise." The court empha-
sized that a federal question existed on the determination of the
tribal court's jurisdiction over the non-Indian, and that "federal
courts are the final arbiters of federal law .... ,,1
The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the tribal appellate court's
assertion over jurisdiction over FMC, which was based on the
test defined in Montana v. United States.'3 The court then ruled
that the Tribes had the power to regulate the employment at
FMC. 14 The case was then remanded to the tribal court to allow
FMC the opportunity to challenge the TERO application under
the ]Indian Civil Rights Act.'5
6. Id.
7. Id.
i. Id. at 1313.
5I. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
10. FMC, 905 F.2d at 1313.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Under Montana, a tribe retains inherent sovereign power
to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands within their reservation
boundaries provided that several circumstances are met. The first is a consensual
relationship test, the second is when the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
tribal political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare. Id. at 565-66.
14. FMC, 905 F,2d at 1314.
15. Id. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 states, in pertinent part that no Indian
tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law[.]" 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
25 U.S.C. § 51 TRIBAL CONTRACT APPROVAL
Stock West Corp. v. Lujan, No. 90-250-JU, 17 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3153 (D. Or. Sept. 27,
1990).
Stock West Corporation (Stock West) entered into separate
contracts with two tribally-incorporated businesses, the Colville
Tribal Enterprise Corporation (CTEC) and the Colville Indian
Precision Pine Company (CIPP). Both contracts provided that
Stock West would manage the construction of and market a
sawmill on the Colville Reservation. Both contracts contained a
section 81 clause.' However, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
refused to approve the contracts because the Tribe was not a
party to either contract. All parties to the contracts believed
BIA approval was necessary yet no appeal was made to the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA).
CTEC and CIPP filed an action in the Colville Tribal Court
alleging breach of contract and served a notice of default (for
undisclosed reasons) on Stock West. Stock West then sued in
federal district court demanding arbitration pursuant to the
contracts. The district court held that it had concurrent juris-
diction with the tribal court and dismissed the case on grounds
of comity. 2 Stock West appealed to the Ninth Circuit which
affirmed the lower court's decision. 3 The tribal court then held
the contracts void for lack of BIA approval.4
1. Title 25 U.S.C. § 81 provides, in pertinent part:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians
... for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value
... , or for granting or procuring any privilege to him ... , or to any
claims growing out of, or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other
moneys, claims, demands, or thing, under laws or treaties with the United
States ... , unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved
as follows:
Second. It shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior
[specifically the Bureau of Indian Affairs] and the Commission of Indian
Affairs indorsed upon it.
25 U.S.C. § 81 (1988).
2. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, No. C-
87-242-RJM, 1, 14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3097 (Aug. 4,
1987).
3. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d
1221, 1227-30 (9th Cir. 1988).
4. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Stock West, Inc., 15 Indian
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6019, 6020-21 (1988).
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Again, BIA refused to grant its approval following a request
by Stock West for retroactive approval of both contracts. Stock
West then commenced an administrative appeal to IBIA but
IBIA dismissed the appeal because of failure of Stock West to
appeal within the statutory time limit. Stock West then filed
again in federal district court for administrative review of the
IBIA dismissal.
Tlhe issues presented to the district court were (1) whether the
district court has subject matter jurisdiction, (2) whether Stock
West has standing, and (3) whether the Colville Tribe is an
indispensable party to the litigation.
The district court found it had subject matter jurisdiction
under the Administrative Procedures Act.5 As to the standing
issue, the court applied the "zone of interest" standard6 and
further inquired into the congressional intent of the class of
plaintiffs.7 The court, after examining 25 U.S.C. § 81, its leg-
islative history, and prior case law, found that section 81 was
a remedial statute designed to protect Indians, not non-Indian
contractors.8 Finally, the court held that the plaintiff, Stock
West, lacked standing because its alleged injury did not fall
within the statutory zone of interests. 9
In analyzing the indispensable party issue, the court deter-
mined that the Tribe was a necessary party to the litigation and,
thus, indispensable under rule 19(a)10 because the Tribe had
contracts with Stock West Corporation to provide timber, and
5. Stock West Corp. v. Lujan, No. 90-250-JU, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian
Law. Training Program) 3153, 3154 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 1990) (referring to 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1989)).
6. A party seeking standing under 5 U.S.C. § 702 must have an interest arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
7. Stock West, 17 Indian L. Rep. at 3154.
13. Id.
9. Id. at 3155.
10. Rule 19(a) provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)
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the sawmill was on tribally-leased land." The court also found
that tribal sovereign immunity barred compelling joinder in the
action.12
The court granted BIA's (the defendant's) motion for dis-
missal pursuant to rule 19(a)(i), emphasizing that an entity doing
business with tribes or tribal corporations is on notice to comply
with section 81, and to secure a proper waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity.1 3
STATE COURTS
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND VOLUNTARY
RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2208 (1990).
CAA, an Athabascan tribal member, gave birth to CMF in
1980. In 1985, CAA sought assistance from Catholic Social
Services (Catholic Services) for alcohol and parental counseling.
In 1986, CAA relinquished custody of her second child, M, to
Catholic Services and CMF was placed in foster care. Catholic
Services returned CMF to CAA one month later. Soon after-
ward, however, CAA voluntarily gave up CMF after having
subjected the child to physical abuse.
Catholic Services requested that CAA sign a Relinquishment
of Parental Rights form. It was later shown that Catholic Serv-
ices did not inform CAA of an alternative form, a Consent to
Adopt. Catholic Services also did not inform CAA that Catholic
Services would become CMF's legal custodian, and did not
mention either the existence of Cook Inlet Tribal Council (Cook
Inlet), a tribal child welfare organization, or that CAA had the
right to be represented by counsel.
CAA voluntarily relinquished her parental rights on June 30,
1986, and the state trial court entered a final decree terminating
CAA's parental rights on July 15, 1986.
After learning of Cook Inlet through an ad, CAA contacted
them for counselling and assistance in regaining custody of
CMF. On the.same day that CMF's foster parents petitioned to
11. Stock West, 17 Indian L. Rep. at 3155.
12. Id. Rule 19(b) provides: "If a person ... cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as
indispensable." FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b).
13. Id. at 3155-56.
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adopt CMF, CAA filed a Revocation of Relinquishment in the
state trial court.
Cook Inlet moved to intervene in the adoption proceeding
and to set aside the termination decree pursuant to section 1914
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 1 The state trial court
vacated CAA's relinquishment of parental rights, citing the
failure of Catholic Services to notify Cook Inlet of the voluntary
relinquishment proceeding.2 Catholic Services appealed to the
state supreme court.
The issue before the Alaska Supreme Court was whether Cook
Inlet was entitled to notice of a voluntary termination of parental
rights proceeding under the ICWA.
The court compared section 1912(a) (involuntary termination)3
with section 1913 (voluntary termination)4 in determining that
Congress did not explicitly grant tribal intervention rights in
voluntary termination proceedings as it did in involuntary ter-
mineation proceedings.5 The court also looked to the legislative
history of the ICWA and the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Guide-
lines for State Courts' to substantiate its decision that tribal
notice was not required in voluntary termination proceedings.7
The court concluded that its decision, in denying tribal rights
to intervention, was not "fundamentally unfair" because Con-
1.. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1914 provides:
Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care placement
or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian
custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian
child's tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate
such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of
section 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.
25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988).
2. Cook Inlet received no notice of the custody proceedings. CAA v. Catholic
Social Servs., Inc., No. 3AN-86394P (Alaska Super. Ct. June 24, 1988).
3-. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) provides:
In any voluntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved[,] the party seeking
the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's
tribe, ... of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
4. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1913 provides: "Where any parent or Indian custodian
voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or to termination of parent rights, such
consent shall not be valid unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a
court of competent jurisdiction . . . ." 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1988).
5. Catholic Seres., 783 P.2d at 159.
6. Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Custody Pro-
ceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,586 (1979).
7. rd.
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gress had stopped short of granting tribes the right to notice in
voluntary proceedings." The court reversed the lower court's
decision and remanded for further proceedings. 9
In a dissent, Justice Jay Rabinowitz stated that the ICWA
explicitly granted tribal rights to intervene in any state court
proceeding termination parental rights to an Indian child. 0 Justice
Rabinowitz stated that tribes have an implicit and fundamental
right to notice of any proceeding within the Act's scope." He
argued that section 1911(c) of the ICWA provides that the tribe
has an unqualified right to intervene at any point in the pro-
ceedings and that the majority erroneously concluded that Con-
gress did not grant this right. 12 Justice Rabinowitz concluded
that the powers to *tribes granted under section 1911 and 1915
are illusory unless the Tribe is given notice of a voluntary
termination proceeding. 3
JURISDICTION: 25 U.S.C. § 483(a)
Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Burris, 790 P.2d 534 (Okla.
1990), reh'g denied, (May 15, 1990).
Two Osage tribal members, Jess Burris (now deceased) and
Joan L. Burris, mortgaged their restricted land to the Federal
Land Bank (FLB),' with the approval of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs (Commissioner). The Burris's defaulted on the
mortgage and FLB filed a foreclosure action in state district
court. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. 2
FLB appealed to the state's supreme court.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1161 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1161-63.
13. Id. at 1163.
1. The restricted Indian land was mortgaged pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 483(a),
which provides:
The individual Indian owners of any land which either is held by the
United Stated in trust for them or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States are authorized, subject to approval
by the Secretary of the Interior, to execute a mortgage or deed of trust
to such land. Such land shall be subject to foreclosure or sale pursuant
to the terms of such mortgage or deed of trust in accordance with the
laws of the State ... in which the land is located. For the purpose of
any foreclosure or sale proceeding[,] the Indian owners shall be regarded
as vested with an unrestricted fee simple title to the land, the United States
shall not be a necessary party to the proceeding .....
25 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1988).
2. Federal Land Bank v. Burris, No. C-87-414 (Dist. Ct. Nov. 16, 1987).
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The issue before the court was whether state courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over foreclosure actions of approved
mortgages of restricted Indian land.
The state supreme court examined the statutory language of
25 U.S.C. § 483(a), its legislative history, and two prior cases
concerning similar foreclosure actions.' However, the court agreed
with FLB that because the Osage Tribe did not have a tribal
court, FLB would be without a remedy or forum. 4
The court interpreted section 483(a) as conferring jurisdiction
to state courts even though that section did not use the word
"jurisdiction. ' ' 5 The court focused on the statutory language
that subjected mortgage foreclosure proceedings to the substan-
tive law of the state in which the land in question is located. 6
In further support of FLB, the court observed that the statute
treated the Burris' title to the mortgaged property as unrestricted
fee simple.7 The court acknowledged that while its decision
departed from Deernose and Smith, it was consistent with the
presumption that the act was neither vain nor useless, 8 and cited
25 U.S.C. § 3559 as persuasive authority. 10
The court concluded by stating that its decision did not con-
flict with its prior decision in Ahboah v. Kiowa Housing Au-
thority," because section 483(a) extinguished the restricted Indian
title. Therefore, the Burris' property could not be considered
.3. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971) (state
court does not have jurisdiction over the foreclosure action, and federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction); Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323 (8th
Cir. 1986) (in affirming Deernose, the court held that (1) section 483(a) did not give
state courts jurisdiction, (2) there is no federal cause of action, and (3) that a tribal
forum was proper).
4. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Burris, 790 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Okla. 1990).
:5. Id. at 537.
6. Id.
7. Id.
13. Id.
9. Title 25 U.S.C. § 355 provides:
[T]he lands of full-blooded members of the Five Civilized Tribes are made
subject to the laws of... Oklahoma providing for the partition of real
estate.... In case of a sale under any decree, or partition, the conveyance
thereunder shall operate to relieve the land described of all restrictions of
every character.
25 U.S.C. § 355 (1988) (emphasis added). However, the court ignored the fact that the
Osage Tribe is not one of the Five Civilized Tribes.
10. Burris, 790 P.2d at 537-38.
11. 660 P.2d 625 (Okla. 1983) (state court has no jurisdiction in Indian country).
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Indian country.' 2 The court reversed the lower courts' decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 3
12. Id. Indian Country is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1988) as "all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished .....
13. Id. at 538-39.
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